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M ost of the contributions to this "Blue Book" focus on the possibility of computer network attacks by States as a methodology for so-called in-
formation warfare and the kinds of responses that may be taken consistendy with 
the constraints of international law. 1 In this chapter, however, the focus shifts 
from the use offorce by States to criminal acts committed by private individuals 
not under the sponsorship or control of a State. With this shift offocus, the appli-
cable legal regime becomes international criminal law rather than provisions of 
the UN Charter governing the use offorce and the maintenance ofinternational 
peace and security. 
To be sure, "international criminal law" is an area of considerable definitional 
ambiguity. Some eminent commentators have denied its very existence.2 Other 
commentators, the majority, have defined international crimes as certain acts 
that constitute a crime against international law seeking only a tribunal withju-
risdiction to apply that law and punish the criminal. Piracy is the prototypical ex-
ample they cite. In response, the sceptics view piracy as solely a municipal law 
crime, the only question of international law being the extent of a State's juris-
diction to apply its criminal law to an accused foreigner acting outside the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the prescribing State.3 
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Even for those crimes arguably constituting crimes under international as well 
as municipal law, it is necessary-in the absence of an international criminal 
court-to employ national law enforcement officials and national courts for 
purposes of apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing offenders. Accordingly, 
another dimension of "international criminal law" involves international coop-
eration in the enforcement of municipal criminal law . Although most efforts to-
ward international cooperation in the enforcement of municipal criminal law 
have been on a bilateral or regional basis, the United Nations has played an in-
creasingly important role in this area. 
Considerable definitional ambiguity also surrounds the terms "terrorism" and 
"international terrorism." Despite strenuous efforts to do so, neither the United 
Nations nor its specialized agencies have been able to agree on a definition of 
"international terrorism."4 Rather, as we shall see later in this chapter, the 
United Nations has adopted a piecemeal approach to the problem through the 
adoption of separate conventions aimed at suppressing particular manifestations 
of terrorism. Although these treaty provisions are often loosely described as 
"antiterrorist," the acts that they cover are criminalized regardless of whether, in 
a particular case, they could be described as "terrorism." 
Even at the domestic level, as illustrated by the US experience, defining inter-
national terrorism is a tricky proposition. Under US law there are a variety of 
definitions that serve a variety of purposes. 5 Most important, at least at the fed-
erallevel, there is no crime of "terrorism" per se. Rather, the Omnibus Diplo-
matic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 provides US criminal jurisdiction 
over the killing of, or an act of physical violence with intent to cause serious 
bodily injury to or that results in such injury to, a US national outside the United 
States.6 Although the relevant chapter of the Act is entided "Extra-territorialJu-
risdiction over Terrorist Acts Abroad against United States Nationals," there is 
no requirement that the killing or violent act include the traditional elements of a 
terrorist act. Instead, the legislation incorporates the elements of terrorism as a 
limitation on prosecutorial discretion: 
(e) LIMITATION ON PROSECUTION. No prosecution for any offense 
described in this Section shall be undertaken by the United States except on 
written certification of the Attorney General or the highest ranking subordinate 
of the Attorney General with responsibility for criminal prosecutions that, in the 
judgment of the certifying official, such offense was intended to coerce, 
intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian population. 
324 
John F. Murphy 
The conference report on the act makes it clear that the certification of the 
Attorney General or his designate is final and not subject to judicial review.7 The 
report also clarifies the meaning of the term "civilian population" by noting that 
it "includes a general population as well as other specific identifiable segments of 
society such as the membership of a religious faith or of a particular 
nationality .... "8 It is not necessary that either the targeted government or the 
civilian population be that of the United States.9 
As a general working definition for this chapter, I shall employ the definitions 
of terrorism utilized by the US Government for statistical and analytical purposes 
since 1983: 
• The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant10 targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. 
• The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or 
territory of more than one country. 
• The term "terrorist group" means any group practIcmg, or that has 
significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.11 
International terrorism is not a new phenomenon, and it is a topic that has 
been subjected to substantial scholarly (and some not so scholarly) analysis. 
Accordingly, in preparing this chapter, I have asked myself what I would call 
the Monty Python question: does the prospect of computer network attacks 
by terrorists constitute something "completely different,"12 or does it amount 
only to a new technique of attack for terrorists raising no new issues of law 
and policy? The answer, it appears, is that the possibility of computer network 
attacks does raise some new issues, although many of the old conundrums still 
pertain. 
Efforts to combat international terrorism may take place at three different 
stages. The first, and ideal, stage is before a terrorist attack has occurred. Here the 
effort is to prevent a terrorist attack, either through the hardening of possible tar-
gets of terrorist attack or through intelligence work that allows law enforcement 
officials to learn of a planned attack in advance and intercept it. 
The second stage involves responding to a terrorist attack while it is in prog-
ress, bringing it to an end, minimizing the damage it causes, and preventing 
panic among the general population. As we shall see, computer network attacks 
may present special challenges at this stage. 
The third and last stage is where the perpetrators of the terrorist acts have suc-
ceeded in their mission, and it is necessary to apprehend them, submit them to 
prosecution before a tribunal with jurisdiction and fair procedures, and, if they are 
325 
Computer Network Attacks by Terrorists 
found guilty, punish them. Here, too, computer network attacks may present spe-
cial challenges. 
In the sections that follow, I address some of the possible problems of combatting 
international terrorism at these three stages raised by the prospect of computer net-
work attacks by terrorists. The final section sets forth some concluding observations. 
Prevention 
The Threat of Computer Network Attacks 
Other chapters in this "Blue Book" discuss the nature of computer network 
attacks at great length and with substantial authority. No attempt is made to du-
plicate these efforts. Rather, this contribution attempts to discuss the concept of 
computer network attacks as a type of international criminal activity that might 
be engaged in by terrorists. 
To this end it may be useful to distinguish, as Michael Schmitt has done in an-
other context,13 between computer network attacks and information opera-
tions . .As explaine.d by Schmitt, "information operations" should be defined 
expansively to "encompass, among an array of other activities, virtually any 
nonconsensual actions intended to discover, alter, destroy, disrupt, or transfer 
data stored in a computer, manipulated by a computer, or transmitted through a 
computer network."14 Moreover, information operations are subdivided into 
defensive and offensive information operations. Computer network attacks fall 
within the latter category and consist of"(o)perations to disrupt, deny, degrade, 
or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the 
computers and networks themselves."15 
So defined, computer network attacks may take a variety of forms. They 
could be limited to the copying of sensitive data, which, depending on the cir-
cumstances, might constitute espionage, or include techniques for altering or 
destroying data and programs. Other computer network attacks might result in 
physical destruction, such as, most ominously, the "meltdown" of a nuclear re-
actor as a consequence of interference with its control system. Still other possible 
examples of computer network attacks have been suggested by Schmitt: 
1. Trains are misrouted and crash after the computer systems controlling them are 
maliciously manipulated. 
2. An information blockade is mounted to limit the flow of electronic 
information into or out of a target State. 
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3. Banking computer systems are broken into and their databases corrupted. 
4. An automated municipal traffic control system is compromised, thereby 
causing massive traffic jams and frustrating responses by emergency fire, medical, 
and law enforcement vehicles. 
5. Intrusion into the computer system controlling water distribution allows the 
intruder to rapidly open and close valves. This creates a hammer effect that 
eventually causes widespread pipe ruptures. 
6. A logic bomb set to activate upon initiation of mass casualty operations is 
imbedded in a municipal emergency response computer system.16 
As he recognizes, some of these examples are realistic while others may 
stretch credulity. 
There is, moreover, the question of the technical capability of individual ter-
rorists to engage in such computer network attacks without State support or 
sponsorship. In the past, the United States and other potential State targets ofter-
rorist attack have benefitted from the relative technological incompetence of the 
terrorists.17 For many years now, however, computer systems have been recog-
nized as being especially vulnerable to terrorist attack.1S And, in the words of one 
e}..-pert, "(t)he growing sophistication of high school students now entering col-
lege will ensure an ever greater pool of persons capable [of engaging in computer 
network attacks]."19 
Another useful distinction to keep in mind is between those computer net-
work attacks that (1) may cause disruption of vital systems leading to widespread 
inconvenience, possibly to some degree of public alarm, but that do not direcdy 
threaten life, and (2) those that direcdy threaten or appear direcdy to threaten 
human life.20 Most computer network attacks are more likely to fill within the 
first category than within the second.21 
A major difficulty facing all efforts to prevent or combat computer network 
attacks is that they can be carried out remotely and often from great distances. 
Since anyone can access the Internet from anywhere in the world, law en-
forcement officials may have no idea where the attacker is located. Under such 
circumstances, law enforcement officials will not know the motive behind the 
attack or the identity of the attackers. Even if they succeed in tracking the 
source of the attack to an Internet Service Provider (ISP), this ISP may be a 
mere conduit, or the attack may actually have originated with a subscriber to 
that service. 
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Hardening of Targets 
Identification and hardening of critical targets of possible terrorist attack has 
long been recognized as a crucial step in preventing terrorist attack.22 Virtually 
every major network-communications, electrical power, pipelines, and 
data-is vulnerable to terrorist attack. The vulnerability of many of these net-
works, however, depends on the would be attacker being able to identify the 
critical nodes. For example, taking out one refinery would have little effect on 
the oil industry. But attacks on certain pipelines could have devastating effects. 
Computer systems, on the other hand, are especially vulnerable, and "(i) it 
would not be difficult to seriously disrupt the Social Security System, nor would 
it be impossible to inflict vast harm to the Federal Reserve."23 
This special vulnerability makes it especially difficult to harden computer net-
works against attack. Electronic vulnerabilities are often harder to guard than 
"traditional" vulnerabilities against terrorist attack. Part of the problem is the 
vastness and complexity of the information infrastructure. As of 1996, for exam-
ple, the defense establishment reportedly had over 2.1 million computers, 
10,000 local networks, and 100 long-distance networks.24 Moreover, although 
it is clear that this infrastructure is subjected to a large number of attacks, the 
number of reported incidents is probably just the tip of the iceberg because, ac-
cording to estimates, only about one in 150 attacks is actually detected and re-
ported.25 The same pattern is likely present in other sectors of the US 
Government and in the vast private sector. 
Security technologies and products-such as, for example, firewalls26 and 
smart cards27-may afford some protection, but they are hardly foolproo(28 Ad-
ditionally, as new security tools are developed, computer network attackers 
learn how to defeat them or exploit other vulnerabilities. 
Human failings greatly compound the problem, as when ine)..-perienced or 
untrained users accidentally publicize their passwords or weak passwords are 
chosen which can be easily guessed. Accordingly, it is generally agreed that train-
ing in information security for personnel, including top management, is a crucial 
element for a good information systems security program.29 
Intelligence Operations 
There is general agreement that the collection and use of intelligence is an ef-
fective tool in combating terrorism. Ideally, the gathering of intelligence serves a 
preventive role and enables law enforcement officials to intercept terrorists at an 
early stage, before they inflict injury on persons or property. However, even 
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with respect to terrorists who employ more conventional methods than com-
puters, this has proven to be a difficult task to accomplish. 
Problems may arise at the national leveL In the United States, for example, 
there is evidence that constraints imposed on intelligence activities from 1975 to 
1980 may have adversely affected the timing and availability of preventive intel-
ligence to the extent that the proportion of cases in which violence or other 
crimes were prevented declined.3o 
The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures and clearly would apply to law enforcement searches of 
computer data bases in the United States. 
The risk to privacy concerns would be especially great under such circum-
stances. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of197831 regulates electronic 
surveillance offoreign powers and the agents offoreign powers and defines "for-
eign power" to include "a group engaged in international terrorism or activities 
in preparation therefor. "32 The act sets up a special court consisting of seven dis-
trictjudges who hear and determine applications for electronic surveillance war-
rants. The statute allows warrantless electronic acquisition of communications 
exclusively between foreign powers not involving a substantial likelihood that 
the surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a 
United States person is a party.33 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does 
not apply to searches and seizures abroad of property owned by non-US citizens 
or permanent residents.34 However, search and seizure of material located in 
computers abroad may be viewed by foreign sovereigns as a violation of their 
territorial sovereignty. Moreover, the standard techniques for obtaining crimi-
nal evidence abroad-letters rogatory and mutual legal assistance treaties, for 
example-are designed to assist in apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing 
those who have already committed crimes, not as a device to gather intelligence 
regarding the possible future commission of a crime. 
Under these circumstances, then, cooperation between US and foreign intelli-
gence officers would seem vital. Nonetheless, foreign laws protecting privacy are, if 
anything, more stringent than those of the United States. Therefore, in either the 
domestic or the international context, the challenge to balance privacy and individ-
ual rights concerns with the requirements of law enforcement is formidable.35 
Management of an On-going Terrorist Incident 
The goals of counter-terrorism efforts during an ongoing terrorist incident 
would at a minimum be threefold: (1) to bring the terrorist attack to an end; 
329 
Computer Network Attacks by Terrorists 
(2) to minimize the damage caused by the attack; and (3) to prevent panic and 
restore order. A computer network attack by terrorists would probably com-
plicate and make fulfilhnent of these goals more difficult. 
This would especially be the case if the computer attack was widespread and 
well coordinated and involved both governmental and private sector targets. 
Suppose, for example, that simultaneous computer attacks disrupted the US 
command and control infrastructure so that individual military units were un-
able to communicate with each other or with a central command; air traffic con-
trol systems were also disrupted, causing planes to crash with substantial loss of 
life; a "computer worm" or "virus" traveled from computer to computer across 
a network, damaging data and causing systems to crash. Assume further that the 
sources of these attacks could not be easily located. The challenges facing au-
thorities seeking to bring the attacks quickly to a halt and to prevent panic would 
be monumental. 
Panic might be particularly pronounced because many otherwise informed 
people tend to dismiss the prospect of computer network attacks as a minor risk. 
According to Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Security, Infra-
structure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism at the National Security Council: 
[CEOs of big corporations] think I'm talking about a 14-year-old hacking into 
their Web sites. I'm talking about people shutting down a city's electricity, 
shutting down 911 systems, shutting down telephone networks and 
transportation systems. You black out a city, people die. Black out lots of cities, 
lots of people die. It's as bad as being attacked by bombs .... Imagine a few years 
from now a President goes forth and orders troops to move. The lights go out, the 
phones don't ring, the trains don't move. That's what we mean by an electronic 
Pearl Harbor.36 
Apprehension, Prosecution, and Punishment 
Apprehension 
Before a suspect can be apprehended, he or she must be located. As has often 
been noted elsewhere in this "Blue Book," computer network attackers can 
frustrate investigatory efforts by "looping and weaving" their attacks through 
several foreign countries, thus gready complicating the efforts ofinvestigators to 
follow their trail. If the suspect is located, it then becomes necessary to induce 
law enforcement officials of the place where he is located to take him into cus-
tody. They will not do so unless the computer network attack in question would 
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be a crime under their local law. 37 This requirement would also have to be met as 
a condition of extradition because of the "double criminality" requirement in 
virtually all extradition treaties.38 
Prosecution and Punishment 
If the suspect is apprehended abroad, the issue arises whether, and if so where, 
he will be prosecuted. At present, no multilateral antiterrorism convention ex-
pressly covers computer attacks.39 However, depending on the circumstances, it 
is possible that one of the existing conventions-e.g., the Convention for Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil A viation4o or even the not 
yet in force International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombing41-could apply. If so, the extradite or prosecute approach that is the 
keystone of these conventions would govern the rights and obligations of the 
States parties. 
Under this approach a State party that apprehends an alleged offender in its 
territory must either extradite him or submit his case to its own authorities for 
purposes ofprosecution.42 Stricdy speaking, none of the antiterrorism conven-
tions alone creates an obligation to extradite; by requiring the submission of al-
leged offenders for prosecution if extra,dition fails, they contain an inducement to 
extradite. Moreover, a legal basis for extradition is provided either in the con-
vention or through incorporation of the offenses mentioned in the convention 
into existing or future e}."tradition treaties between the parties. To varying de-
grees, the conventions also obligate the parties to take the important practical 
step of attempting to apprehend the accused and hold him in custody.43 
The most important goal of these provisions is to ensure prosecution of the 
accused. To this end, the conventions state quite strongly the alternative obliga-
tion either to e}."tradite or to submit the accused for prosecution. The obligation, 
however, is not to try the accused, much less to punish him, but to submit the 
case to be considered for prosecution by the appropriate national prosecuting 
authority. If the prosecuting State's criminal justice system lacks integrity, the 
risk of political intervention in the prosecution or at trial exists. Such interven-
tion may prevent the trial or conviction of the accused, or act as a mitigating in-
fluence at the sentencing stage. 
Even if the prosecuting State's criminal justice system functions with integ-
rity, it may be very difficult to obtain the evidence necessary to convict the ac-
cused when the alleged offense was committed in another country. This very 
practical impediment to conviction can be removed only by patient and sus-
tained efforts to develop and expand ':iudicial assistance" and other forms of 
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cooperation between the law enforcement and judicial systems of different 
countries. The conventions create an obligation to cooperate in this regard, but, 
as will be demonstrated in greater detail later, this obligation is often difficult for 
countries with different types oflegal systems to meet, even assuming that they 
act in complete good faith. The difficulty may be even greater when cybercrime 
is involved. 
Many, perhaps most, instances of computer network attack would not be 
covered by the antiterrorist conventions. In such cases, the United States would 
need to engage in a process of rendition to get the suspect before a US court. Be-
sides extradition, the forms of rendition include exclusion, deportation, and ab-
duction.44 Subject perhaps to very limited exceptions, abduction is illegal,45 and 
exclusion and deportation involve unilateral action by the State of refuge and are 
relatively informal measures subject to a relative lack oflegallimitations. Extradi-
tion is generally recognized as the only process of rendition that satisfactorily 
protects the rights of an accused. Assuming that the United States did not wish or 
could not convince the State of refuge to deport the accused, it would try to ex-
tradite her. The obstacles to the success of this endeavor, however, could be 
considerable. 
Barriers to Extradition 
First, the requested country would be under no obligation to extradite absent 
an extradition treaty between it and the United States.46 Although the United 
States is a party to more than 100 bilateral extradition treaties and to the 
Inter-American Convention on Extradition with 13 parties,47 the absence of an 
extradition treaty has been a problem in some high profile cases.48 Moreover, al-
though the United States would be entitled to use most of the antiterrorist con-
ventions for purposes of extradition, it has chosen not to do so.49 The United 
States also will not itself extradite a person to a requesting country in the absence 
of an extradition treaty.50 
Even with an extradition treaty, the e:h.'tradition process is often fraught with 
difficulties. As already noted, many, if not most, US extradition treaties require 
that the action in question be a crime in both the requesting and requested 
country for extradition to take place. This dual criminality requirement can 
pose major problems in computer crime cases. Although the United States has 
amended its criminal code to penalize a wide range of computer crimes, other 
countries have been slow in doing the same. 51 This has resulted in cases where 
the United States has identified the location of a perpetrator of a computer 
crime, but has been unable to secure her extradition because the act in ques-
tion was not a crime under the law of the country where the perpetrator was 
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found and the extradition treaty between the United States and the country in 
question contained a dual criminality requirement. 52 Although there is wide-
spread recognition that countries need to reach a consensus as to which com-
puter related activities should be criminalized, this is a process that will take 
some time. 53 
Under the e:Jo.."tradition law of a number of countries, it is necessary for a re-
questing country to present the requested country with satisfactory (to the re-
quested country) evidence that a crime covered by the treaty has been 
committed.54 This has especially been the case with common law countries. 
Great Britain, for example, traditionally required prima facie evidence of a crime 
covered by the extradition treaty. For countries on the continent of Europe, 
which had no such requirement, this posed a "mystery" as to precisely how 
much evidence was required to meet tIlls standard. 55 In 1982, approximately a 
third of the applications made to the United Kingdom under its extradition trea-
ties failed and the most common cause of failure was the requesting State's in-
ability to satisfy the prima facie requirement. 56 Because of this record offailure in 
the extradition process, Great Britain amended its extradition law in 1989 to ex-
clude selectively the prima facie requirement in relation to certain States, and 
then ratified the European Extradition Convention, which has no such require-
ment.57 Instead, the convention requires only that the request be accompanied 
by a certificate of conviction or the warrant for arrest, a statement of the offense 
and a copy of the necessary laws.58 The US test of "probable cause," which re-
quires only that there be reasonable grounds to make it proper that an accused be 
tried for the crime, has not proven to be a barrier to extradition. 59 
The prima facie requirement has been defended on the ground that it oper-: 
ates as a necessary protection for the individual who otherwise may be removed 
to another State merely because he is suspected of having committed a crime 
covered by the extradition treaty.60 Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the 
prima facie requirement makes e:Jo.."tradition more difficult. This difficulty may be 
especially great if computer network attacks are involved because the barriers to 
gathering evidence in such cases, as already noted, may be substantial. 
Another barrier to the extradition ofintemational terrorists may be the refusal 
of some countries, especially those with a civil law background, to extradite their 
nationals. 61 One of the grounds advanced by Libya in refusing to surrender two 
Libyan members of the Libyan secret service who were indicted by a grand jury 
of the District of Columbia in November 1991 for the December 1987 explo-
sion of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland that killed 270 persons, in-
cluding 189 Americans, was that the Libyan Constitution prohibited the 
extradition of Libyan nationals.62 
333 
Computer Network Attacks by Terrorists 
The Austrian Supreme Court has gone so far to claim that the provision in 
the Austrian Constitution prohibiting the extradition of nationals reflected "a 
generally recognized rule ofinternationallaw."63 Even the government of the 
United Kingdom reserves the right not to extradite nationals where there is no 
extradition treaty with the requesting State and the latter is seeking the fugitive's 
return under a multilateral, antiterrorist convention.64 
At least in Europe, however, the situation changed substantially in 1996, 
when the European Union concluded a Convention Relating to Extradition of 
Nationals.65 The first paragraph of Article 7 of that convention provides that e}"1ra-
dition may not be refused on the ground that the "person claimed is a national of 
the requested Member State." But the second and third paragraphs of Article 7 of 
the convention permit a five year rolling reservation allowing member States to 
refuse extradition of their nationals. According to Geoff Gilbert, the E},.'Planatory 
Report "makes clear several matters:" 
[F]irst, that the Nordic members of the European Union will no longer classify 
domiciled aliens as nationals for the purposes ofintra-EU extradition; secondly, 
that the protection of nationals might be achieved by those States which do not 
ordinarily extradite nationals, by entering a reservation that any sentence imposed 
by the requesting State will be served in the requested State; next, that given that 
some States are constitutionally prohibited from extraditing their own nationals, 
that they review the scope of the restriction at least once every five years; and, 
finally, that reservations are not indefinite and can lapse.66 
In other words, even with the conclusion of the 1996 convention civil law 
countries resist extraditing their own nationals. 
On the other hand, as to certain international crimes, there is some evidence 
that civil law States are beginning to relax their previous practice of never extra-
diting their nationals, at least in their extradition relations \vith common law 
States. For example, the 1983 extradition treaty between the United States and 
Italy specifically provides that extradition shall not be refused on grounds of na-
tionality and is aimed at combatting the coordinated organized crime in the two 
countries.67 Further, the increasing practice of repatriating prisoners to serve 
their sentences in their own country has reportedly convinced some civil law 
countries in Europe to extradite their nationals to common law countries.68 
Outside of Europe there has also been some movement, albeit it slow and 
tentative. In 1979 the United States and Colombia concluded an extradition 
treaty that allowed for the surrender of nationals. 69 The treaty was a response to 
the inability of the United States to secure the extradition of Colombian 
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nationals who had imported illegal drugs, especially cocaine, into the United 
States and who had so corrupted Colombian law enforcement officials that trial 
in Colombia was not possible. The new extradition treaty was extremely un-
popular in Colombia, however, and in 1988 the Colombia Supreme Court de-
clared the treaty unconstitutional.7° Repeated efforts by the United States 
resulted in Colombia passing a new law allowing for the extradition of its na-
tionals in 1997,71 and at this writing Colombia has extradited two drug suspects 
to the United States.72 
Relations between the United States and Mexico concerning the possible ex-
tradition of Mexican nationals have been especially tortuous.73 Under the· 
US-Mexican E).."tradition Treaty,74 neither party is required to extradite its na-
tionals. Rather, Article 9 of the treaty gives both parties the option to prosecute 
as an alternative to e).."tradition, and from 1978 until 1996 Mexico, as a matter of 
policy, refused to e).."tradite its citizens to the United States.75 Moreover, alleg-
edly as a result of corruption among Mexican law enforcement officials, persons 
that the United States sought to extradite, especially for drug trafficking, were 
often not prosecuted in Mexico. Finally, in 1996, Mexico surrendered four ofits 
citizens to the United States for prosecution, two of them for drug trafficking.76 
Nonetheless, since that time, Mexico's record, from the US perspective, has been 
unsatisfactory,77 and there have been recent court challenges to the extradition of 
Mexican nationals that may have to be resolved by Mexico's highest court.78 
Recognition by the requested country that the requesting country has juris-
diction to try the accused is a prerequisite to extradition. The complexity of civil 
and criminal jurisdictional issues in cyberspace, however, is just beginning to be 
recognized.79 
In recent years, at both the state and the federal level, the United States has 
extended the death penalty to more and more crimes, including terrorist 
. crimes.80 By contrast, since World War II, opposition to the death penalty has 
resulted in many countries including clauses in extradition treaties that exclude 
extradition where the requesting State retains the death penalty and is unwilling 
or unable to provide assurances that this penalty will not be carried out if the 
accused is extradited.81 This development has greatly complicated US extradi-
tion relations ,vith other countries, including cases involving terrorist crimes.82 
Another important development in recent years has been the increasing im-
portance of human rights considerations as a limitation on extradition.83 Oppo-
sition to the death penalty in the Western European States is based in large part 
on the belief that it violates fundamental human rights values. On the other 
hand, as noted by John Dugard and Christine Van den Wyngaert, "[t]oday states 
are irreconcilably divided over the morality and effectiveness of the death 
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penalty, "84 and as a result its imposition is not prohibited by general international 
law. Under certain circumstances, however, according to some authorities, im-
position of the death penalty may constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment or punishment, and thus violate general international law norms. 
The best known of these authorities is the decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom.85 Soering, a West German national, 
murdered his girlfriend's parents in Virginia and fled to the United Kingdom. In 
response to a US request, the United Kingdom ordered his extradition to the 
United States. Soering, however, petitioned the European Commission ofHu-
man Rights, which referred his case to the European Court of Human Rights. 
The court held that the United Kingdom had an obligation under Article 3 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment, not to extradite Soering to the 
United States where there was a real risk that he would be subjected to inhuman 
or degrading treatment by being kept on death row for a prolonged period in the 
state of Virginia. Eventually Soering was extradited to the United States when 
the United Kingdom received assurances from US officials that he would not be 
subjected to the death penalty.86 
Although it is not a judicial body with authority to hand down a decision 
binding on parties to a dispute, the Human Rights Committee, which is the 
body established by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights87 
to supervise implementation of the covenant by States parties, found in Ng v. 
Canada88 that California's practice of executing by gas asphyxiation, which 
might take over ten minutes to cause death, resulted in prolonged suffering con-
stituting cruel and inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 7 of the 
covenant. On the basis of this finding, the committee was of the opinion that 
Canada, which could reasonably have foreseen that Ng would be executed in 
this way, had violated its obligations under the covenant by e:ll.."traditing him to 
the United States. 
In 1980 Alona Evans identified the political offense exception, which is 
grounded, at least in part, in human rights considerations,89 as the "hot issue" of 
extradition law.9o At that time, the political exception was regarded as perhaps 
the primary barrier to the extradition of international terrorists.91 But in recent 
years States have taken a variety of steps to limit or even to eliminate the political 
offense exception as a defense to extradition,92 and it is unclear whether the politi-
cal offense exception remains a major barrier to e:ll..1:radition at the present time.93 
As an alternative to or a substitute for the political offense exception, extradi-
tion treaties may permit the accused to claim that he will not receive a fair trial in 
the requesting country. Article 3(a) of the United States-United Kingdom 
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Supplementary Extradition Treaty of 1985,94 for example, expressly permits a 
judicial inquiry into whether the extraditee will be "prejudiced at his trial or 
punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, reli-
gion, nationality or political opinions." This so-called "humanitarian exception" 
was inserted because of the concern of some US Senators that the elimination of 
the political offense exception effected by the supplementary extradition treaty 
would result in inadequate protection for extraditees. By giving the courts the 
responsibility of ruling on allegations of an unfair trial, the treaty waters down 
the rule of noninquiry US courts normally apply, under which the courts defer 
to the executive branch to make the decision as to the validity of such allega-
tions.95 In practice, however, courts in the United States have been extremely 
reluctant to make a finding that would reflect on the standards of justice in the 
United Kingdom.96 On the other hand, courts in both the United States and 
Canada have held that the rule of noninquiry is not absolute and that it will not 
be followed if the likely treatment in the requesting State would be shocking or 
simply unacceptable.97 
As a result of these many barriers, the extradition process has been described as 
"a creaking steam engine of an affair."9B Former US Attorney General Benjamin 
R. Civiletti was of the view that extradition laws belong to "the world of the 
horse and buggy and the steamship, not in the world of commercialjet air trans-
portation and high speed telecommunications."99 It is therefore not surprising 
that law enforcement officials have often turned to alternative forms of rendition 
in their efforts to bring alleged offenders to a forum for prosecution. 
Alternatives to Extradition 
One alternative to extradition that has been employed with some frequency 
in Europe is "hot pursuit."100 This approach allows the police authorities of one 
State to cross the borders of a neighboring State in hot pursuit of a fleeing fugi-
tive, and it is consistent with the policy of internal open borders that the Euro-
pean Union has followed since 1993. Also, the Schengen Accord of 1990,101 
concluded among Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands, allows the police agencies of the States parties to 
cross borders in hot pursuit, although the precise scope of this authority is a mat-
ter of dispute.102 Outside of Europe, the doctrine of hot pursuit is apparently not 
\videly utilized as a method of rendition.103 
The methods of rendition most often utilized as alternatives to extradition are 
exclusion and deportation.104 Exclusion may occur when fugitives are appre-
hended as they attempt to enter a country, and deportation may be an option 
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when fugitives are arrested within a country's territory. In US practice, not sur-
prisingly, many of these exclusions and deportations have involved Canada and 
Mexico and have been directed towards persons accused of drug trafficking. lOS 
Both exclusion and deportation are civil processes, designed for immigration con-
trol and dominated by the executive. As a consequence, exclusion and deportation 
proceedings utilized for rendition purposes do not apply criminal justice standards, 
either with respect to the interests of the States involved or to protection of the ac-
cused. Unlike e>..1:radition, exclusion and deportation rarely involve a fonnal re-
quest by a State seeking a return of the alleged offender. On the contrary, 
exclusion and deportation are effected at the instance of a territorial State.106 
Perhaps the most controversial use of deportation as an alternative to e>..1:radi-
tion was the case of Joseph Doherty. After unsuccessful attempts to extradite 
Doherty, a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, from the United 
States to the United Kingdom, where he was wanted for his role in the death of a 
British soldier and for his escape from prison, because of decisions by US courts 
that his offenses fell within the political offense exception in the US-UK extradi-
tion treaty,107 the United States Supreme Court upheld his deportation to 
Northern Ireland after long and complicated legal proceedings. lOS Apparently, 
the deportation of Doherty was handled as a purely internal matter and not in re-
sponse to a request from the United Kingdom that he be deported. Although 
some commentators have argued that it is improper for one State to request an-
other to deport an individual as a means of circumventing extradition proce-
dures, US courts have repeatedly held that the existence of an extradition treaty 
between the United States and another country does not bar the use of other 
means to obtain custody over a criminal located abroad. 109 In contrast, complic-
ity between the French government and another government to use deportation 
as an alternative to extradition may reportedly be the basis for dismissal of the 
prosecution.110 . 
The most controversial alternative to extradition has, of course, been abduc-
tion or kidnaping of alleged offenders. Both commentators and State practice 
support the general proposition that international law prohibits a State from 
sending its agents into another State to abduct an individual residing there \vith-
out that other State's permission.111 Abductions would seem prima facie to vio-
late a principal rule of international law, which states that a nation is absolutely 
sovereign within the boundaries of its own territory. 
There is at least an argument, however, that abduction may be consistent with 
international law u~der certain extraordinary circumstances. Despite the prohi-
bition against the use of unilateral force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, Arti-
cle 51 allows a victim of an armed attack to use force to defend itself pending 
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action by the Security Council.112 Justification of a government sponsored ab-
duction of a fugitive necessarily requires characterizing the actions of the fugitive 
as an "anned attack" within the meaning of Article 51.113 This characterization 
has most often been applied to cases of terrorism and drug trafficking. In 1989, 
eX'Pressly repudiating an earlier opinion to the contrary in 1980,114 then Assistant 
Attorney General William Barr produced a legal opinion that international law 
allowed US law enforcement officials to make extraterritorial arrests under cer-
tain circumstances.11S Testifying before Congress, Barr stated on behalf of the 
Department of Justice: 
[T]here are instances where extraterritorial arrest without the host sovereign's 
consent may be justified under intemationallaw. For example, in response to an 
actual or threatened terrorist attack, we would have good grounds under general 
principles ofinternationallaw to justify extraterritorial law enforcement actions 
over a foreign sovereign's objections. Moreover, in appropriate circumstances we 
may have a sound basis under international law to take action against large-scale 
drug traffickers being given safe haven by a government acting in complicity with 
their criminal enterprise. Thus, it may well be that the President will choose to 
direct extraterritorial arrests only when he believes that he is justified in doing so 
as a matter of self-defense under international law. 116 
The validity of Mr. Barr's proposition has been subject to sharp debate.117 In 
practice, however, at least as of this writing, the US Government has made no 
extraterritorial arrests of alleged terrorists without the consent of the territorial 
sovereign. The 1987 sting operation that resulted in the apprehension of Fa was 
Y ounis took place on a US ship in the Mediterranean after Y ounis had been 
lured there by US agents.118 -
In contrast, the US Government has made extraterritorial arrests in drug traf-
ficking cases.119 The most controversial of these Was the 1990 apprehension and 
deportation to the United States of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain by Mexi-
can agents paid by the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Dr. Alvarez-
Machain was a prominent Mexican gynecologist who had been indicted for the 
kidnap and murder of Enrique Camarena, a DEA agent stationed in Guadalajara. 
Mter strong protests by the Mexican Government, and a circuit court opinion 
holding that the abduction violated the US-Mexico extradition treaty,120 the 
US Supreme Court ruled that the abduction was not barred by the extradition 
treaty and that US courts could exercise jurisdiction over the case.121 Although 
the majority opinion all but conceded by way of dicta that the abduction vio-
lated norms of customary international law, 122 the court did not address the issue 
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of whether this might constitute a basis for US courts to decline jurisdiction. 
Courts in several other countries have ruled that they have discretion in such cir-
cumstances to refuse to exercise jurisdiction. 123 
The Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain has been subjected to 
sharp criticism.124 Be that as it may, Geoff Gilbert has suggested that, paradoxi-
cally, the Court's decision may "hasten the demise of State sponsored kidnaps of 
alleged international criminals, for it has brought to the fore this attempt to au-
thorize the 'manifesdy illegal."'125 Indeed, in the wake of Alvarez-Machain, the 
Bush Administration quickly responded with assurances that it had no intention 
of either increasing or institutionalizing the practice of e:l\."traterritorial abduc-
tions. 126 Also, in 1994, the United States and Mexico concluded a Treaty to 
Prohibit Transborder Abductions127 (which, however, as of this writing has not 
yet been sent to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification). 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
Regardless of what method of rendition is used, once an accused is before a 
US court, it is necessary to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But if the 
evidence to do this is located abroad, and cannot be obtained, the successful ren-
dition of the accused may be a pyrrhic victory. 
Moreover, the legal mechanisms for obtaining evidence abroad for use in 
criminal proceedings are less than satisfactory.128 Letters rogatory, the standard 
mechanism, are especially ill-suited for obtaining evidence regarding computer 
crimes. Letters rogatory require an application to a foreign court and usually pro-
vide for advance notice and participation by opposing parties. Hence, the proce-
dure is relatively public, as compared to the US practice of conducting criminal 
investigations under the veil of grand jury secrecy. It is, moreover, even under 
the best of circumstances extremely slow, and foreign tribunals may give limited 
or no assistance at the pre-indictment phase of a case. In any event, the decision 
offoreign tribunals to respond favorably is purely discretionary, since the letters 
rogatory practice is based on comity considerations rather than on binding inter-
national legal norms. 
Because they create binding international legal obligations for the States par-
ties, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) may be of greater value. As of 
November 15, 1997, the United States had 23 MLATs in force. 129 They provide 
prosecutors with a channel for sending requests for assistance in obtaining evi-
dence through a Central Authority in one country130 to a corresponding prose-
cutorial authority in the other country, which oversees the prompt execution of 
the request. Under MLATs, foreign prosecutorial authorities will normally seek 
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mandatory process under their law, when necessary, to execute the request and 
keep it confidential to the extent possible. 
The US MLATs contain a provision that obligates a requested country to 
conduct searches and seizures on behalf of a requesting country if the request in-
cludes infonnation justifying such action under the laws of the requested coun-
try. Only a few of these MLATs, however, apply broadly to all law enforcement 
investigations and prosecutions, rather than only to certain types of offenses such 
as drug trafficking and money laundering. Additionally, the political offense ex-
ception is often available in MLATs and can be a barrier to obtaining the neces-
sary evidence. Finally, even though the MLAT process is usually much faster 
than letters rogatory, as we have seen, evidence of computer crime can be rapidly 
transferred out of the jurisdiction of the requested country to other countries 
\vith whom the United States has no MLAT. 
Especially for the collection of electronic evidence, MLATs, while an im-
provement on letters rogatory, are unequal to the task. The problem has been 
aptly posed by Michael Sussmann: "How does law enforcement collect elec-
tronic evidence that may be scattered acroSs several different countries, can be 
deleted or altered \vith one click of a mouse, may be encrypted, and will ulti-
mately need to be authenticated in another country's court?"131 The ability to 
delete or alter electronic evidence with the click of a mouse renders even the rel-
atively rapid procedures available under MLATs hopelessly slow and cumber-
some. Accordingly, in Sussmann's view: 
[W]hen electronic evidence is sought, there may be a need for mechanisms such 
as a "preservation of evidence request" or "protected seizure," which would 
work as follows. Where there is a particularized concern about the loss of 
electronic evidence, a country would make an informal international request that 
the data immediately be preserved. This could be accomplished in a number of 
ways, from having a telecommunications carrier or ISP [Internet Service 
Provider] copy and store a customer's data, to actually seizing a criminal's 
computer and securing, but not searching, it for a short period of time. Once data 
is (sic) protected from loss, eA-pedited processes would provide the foreign 
country \vith formal documentation to authorize the issuance of a domestic 
search warrant or similar process.132 
As Sussmann notes, the US Code provides for a fonn of "preservation of evi-
dence" request.133 Most other countries apparently do not have such provisions 
in their laws, although the need for them has recently been recognized, at least in 
principle. Once such provisions are in place, it may be necessary to revise the 
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MLATs to ensure that the law enforcement officials of the other party to the 
treaty will be able to take advantage of them. 
Transborder searches and seizures are an especially difficult problem when 
electronic evidence is involved. Although paper documents are normally lo-
cated in the same country as the person being investigated, this is not necessarily 
the case with electronic evidence. To the contrary, electronic data may be stored 
in another country or countries to keep them beyond the reach of law 
enforcement. 
Transborder searches consist of a law enforcement officer in his or her own 
country accessing a computer in another country to obtain electronic evi-
dence. 134 Such searches may take place unknowingly. For example, if an in-
vestigator searches the computer of a domestic corporation, the data accessed 
through that search may be located in another country unbeknovmst to the in-
vestigator. Unconsented to transborder searches of electronic evidence may be 
viewed by the country where the search occurs as a violation of its sovereignty 
or even of its criminal law, subjecting the individual investigator to possible 
criminal liability. From a law enforcement perspective, it is necessary for coun-
tries to agree on principles permitting transborder searches under clearly de-
fined but broad circumstances.135 Others may be of the view that the need to 
protect data in a particular country outweighs law enforcement concerns. Al-
though this issue is currendy being debated in several international forums, its 
outcome is far from certain.136 
If an investigator succeeds in accessing electronic evidence, wherever it may 
be located, the evidence may be unintelligible because it is encrypted, i.e., 
scrambled to protect its confidentiality. The need for encryption is ,videly rec-
ognized as necessary to protect the confidentiality of e-mail traffic, stored data, 
and commercial transactions. However, when criminals use encryption for 
communications or data storage, they may severely hamper criminal investiga-
tions by preventing timely access to the content of seized or intercepted data. 
Hence, law enforcement officials are concerned that they be able to obtain the 
"keys" to decrypt encrypted data.137 In contrast, privacy advocates, cyber-rights 
groups, and defense counsel, among others, oppose granting law enforcement 
broad authority in this area. 
Moreover, according to Phillip Reitinger, the principal legal obstacle to 
law enforcement access to "plaintext" (i.e., unencrypted or decrypted text) 
and keys is the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.138 
Reitinger concludes that a grand jury subpoena can order the production of 
the plaintext of encrypted documents and the production of documents that 
reveal keys. He further concludes, however, that whether law enforcement 
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can compel production of keys that are only known, rather than recorded, is 
an open question.139 
At this writing, Congress has passed, and the President has signed, the 
"Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of2001."140 
This highly controversial legislation, which critics have argued could be used 
overzealously and harm innocent people,141 provides, for the first time, for fed-
eral monitoring of computer communications, allowing investigators to track 
the sending and receiving of e-mail and Internet connections. They will not, 
however, be able to read the content of such computer communications with-
out first obtaining a warrant. The legislation will also, among other things, allow 
investigators to conduct unannounced searches of property owned or occupied 
by terrorism suspects and to share information from federal criminal investiga-
tions \vith intelligence agencies for the first time. 
There is also controversy over the efforts oflaw enforcement officials to se-
cure laws that would permit them to sidestep encryption.142 Regardless of how 
this debate is resolved, there is a need to reach agreement at the international 
level on decryption support services. As Michael Sussmann has pointed out, 
only the more modem of US MLATs contain provisions that are flexible 
enough to accommodate such newer forms of assistance as decryption ser-
vices.143 Even these MLATs do not specifically address the subject of decryp-
tion, and there currendy are no international commitments to provide decryp-
tion support. Although there are discussions and negotiations underway in 
various international forums designed to resolve the problems of access to 
computers by law enforcement persons and encryption along with related is:'" 
sues, the final outcome of these efforts is uncertain at this writing.144 
Some Concluding Observations 
From the foregoing discussion, one may safely conclude that the prospect of 
computer network attacks by terrorists has only recendy begun to receive the at-
tention-from statesmen, law enforcement officials, and scholars-that it de-
serves. Moreover, although international terrorism has long been a subject of 
intense scrutiny, the prospect of computer network attacks by terrorists intro-
duces legal and operational complications for those engaged in efforts to prevent, 
contain, and punish terrorist attacks. 
Law and the legal process has traditionally lagged technological develop-
ments and the computer revolution is no exception. In particular, the speed 
\vith which computers operate and the anonymity of their operators create 
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challenges for the "snail pace" of traditional law enforcement methods. Also, as 
we have seen, at the domestic level in the United States there is currently a sig-
nificant tension between the perceived needs oflaw enforcement and protec-
tion of the privacy rights of US citizens. At the international level this tension 
is likely to be as intense, perhaps even more, than it is in the United States, 
since the Europeans, for example, strongly emphasize the protection of privacy 
in their law and practice.145 
Although there are strenuous efforts in various international fora to resolve 
these problems, including the adoption of a draft convention on computer crime 
under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the success of these endeavors is by 
no means assured. Nonetheless, it has long been a truism that international coop-
eration is crucial to successful efforts to combat international terrorism.146 This 
truism applies a fortiori to efforts to combat computer network attacks by 
terrorists. 
Moreover, international cooperation in combating terrorism has often taken 
the form of informal arrangements and liaisons between law enforcement offi-
cials in several countries, rather than the use of formal arrangements spelled out 
in treaties or national legislation. In view of the speed with which law enforce-
ment personnel need to act to cope with a computer network attack, informal-
ity is likely to be required to give law enforcement the flexibility it needs to 
operate successfully. At the same time, the need for appropriate restraints on law 
enforcement of the kind provided by legal regulation is also great in the field of 
computer crime. The struggle to find the right balance is likely to continue for 
some time to come. 
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